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How to analyze a detection

This walkthrough shows how to analyze one detection starting directly from the Detections page. It follows the same structure as How to analyze top affected internal IPs, but focuses on a single detection title in depth.

The example is Confirmed C2 Beacon With Lateral Movement — a behaviour detection with strong evidence on the wire, taken from a demonstration environment.

Step 1 — Find the detection​

Open Security › Detections and select All Events. Narrow the list:

FilterValue in this exampleWhy
CategoryC2Focus on command-and-control activity
SortHighest RiskPut the most urgent detections first
Time rangeLast 24 hoursThe period to review

Detections filtered to category C2, sorted by highest risk

The top event is Confirmed C2 Beacon With Lateral Movement — risk 93, severity HIGH, from internal 172.168.1.100 to external 148.153.216.91 on port 8813. A second event with the same title from the same host goes to a different destination (47.84.201.120, port 8800) — note this for later.

Select the event to open the detection detail.

Step 2 — Understand what was detected​

Detection detail: Confirmed C2 Beacon With Lateral Movement

SectionValue in this exampleMeaning
HeaderRisk 93, HIGH, category C2, method Behaviour, confidence 95%A behaviour-based detection with very high confidence
What HappenedBeaconing to an external controller plus movement between internal hosts — the pattern of an active intrusionTwo things were seen together: regular check-ins to an external host, and unusual internal communication
Asset172.168.1.100, internalThe host under suspicion
Peer148.153.216.91, external, port 8813The suspected external controller
What Triggered This DetectionConfirmed C2 with lateral movement (BEHAVIOUR), timing threat score 0.766One behaviour alert; the timing score measures how regular and suspicious the timing is

A Behaviour detection is not based on a known signature. It is raised because the traffic pattern resembles an attack. The next steps confirm whether the pattern is really present, and whether it is malicious.

Step 3 — Read the risk signals and MITRE ATT&CK​

Scroll to Risk Signals. Highlighted signals are elevated.

Risk signals and MITRE ATT&CK techniques

SignalValueInterpretation
Beaconingconfirmed, interval CV 0.81Connections repeat at regular intervals — the key sign of automated check-ins. Interval CV (coefficient of variation) describes how much the intervals vary
Temporal Threat77%, off-hours activityActivity continues outside normal working hours
Fan-out / Lateral3.1×, lateral movement detectedThe host talks to about three times more internal peers than usual
ML Anomaly53%, within baselineOverall volume is not unusual — the concern is the pattern, not the size
Connection Rate2/minLow and steady — typical of beacons, which avoid attracting attention
Peer Deviation0%The peer is not unusual compared with this host's normal peers — the behaviour has been going on for some time

The MITRE ATT&CK panel maps the detection to several techniques:

TechniqueTacticRelevance
T1071 / T1071.001Command and ControlCommunication with a controller using an application-layer protocol
T1021Lateral MovementUse of remote services to reach other internal hosts
T1078 / T1078.002Stealth / Defense EvasionUse of valid (domain) accounts

The mitigations listed — M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention and M1037 Filter Network Traffic — are the recommended follow-up actions.

Step 4 — Verify the evidence in the records​

The Records section shows the traffic between the asset and the peer.

Records showing the beacon pattern

ObservationMeaning
90 records, Outbound 90, Inbound 0The internal host always starts the communication
All records are CONN, UDP, state SFShort, completed UDP exchanges — no application protocol identified
Each check-in contacts six ports at once (8810–8815)A fixed, programmed behaviour
Check-ins at 03:24:06, 03:28:06, 03:32:06, 03:36:06, 03:40:06 …Exactly every 4 minutes — the beacon interval, visible in the records
Each exchange is about 414 B ↑ / 410 B ↓Small, identical keep-alive messages; no data transfer

This confirms that the beaconing is real: the host checks in to 148.153.216.91 on a fixed schedule, day and night. What the records do not show yet is who the destination is and whether the check-ins are authorized.

tip

Use Go to Records → to see the full history of this communication beyond ±30 minutes, and to check whether other internal hosts contact the same peer.

Step 5 — Analyze the participants​

Asset​

Open Participant & History (middle icon). The Detections — 172.168.1.100 list shows that the same host also has repeated Serve-Only Role Unexpected External Egress (C2) and ML Anomaly (UEBA) detections.

Participant panel: asset and its other detections

Select Asset Centric to open the asset profile:

Asset profile of 172.168.1.100

FieldValueInterpretation
RolecameraAn IP camera — it should mainly serve video, not initiate external connections
VendorZhejiang Dahua Technology Co., Ltd.Camera manufacturer — relevant when checking for vendor cloud services
VLAN168The camera network segment
Detections3 types · 23 detectionsRepeated activity, not a one-off event
Peers32 active · 10 suspectSeveral of its communication partners are considered suspicious

Use Relation Map on the asset profile to see which internal hosts the camera communicates with — this is where the lateral-movement signal can be checked.

Peer​

Switch the panel to Peer.

Participant panel: peer

  • 148.153.216.91 is External with no asset profile.
  • Detections — 148.153.216.91 lists further detections involving the same peer, including Serve-Only Role Unexpected External Egress and ML Anomaly. When several cameras contact the same destination, the behaviour is shared across the device fleet.

Third-party reputation​

Select Lookup › VirusTotal:

VirusTotal result for 148.153.216.91

FieldValueMeaning
Detection score0 / 89, all vendors UnratedNo vendor has information about this address — neither good nor bad
Network / AS148.153.216.0/23, AS11439 (VertexCore LLC)A hosting network

A score of 0 does not mean the address is safe — it means it is unknown. This is common for new attack infrastructure and also for vendor cloud relay servers. The decision must therefore rest on your own evidence. See Verify the peer with third-party sources for how to read these services.

Step 6 — Decide​

QuestionFinding
Is the beaconing real?Yes — 90 outbound UDP check-ins exactly every 4 minutes to six ports
Should this device contact the internet?A camera is a serve-only role; outbound connections are not expected unless a cloud service is used
Is the destination known?Unknown — no reputation data; hosting network
Is it limited to one device?No — the same peer appears in detections for other cameras; the host also beacons to 47.84.201.120
Is there sign of spread?Fan-out 3.1× and 10 suspect peers — requires checking with Relation Map

There are two possible explanations:

ExplanationWhat would confirm it
Authorized vendor cloud / remote-view serviceThe camera owner confirms that the vendor's cloud or mobile remote-view feature is enabled and required, and the destinations belong to that service
Compromised device (C2)The feature is not in use, the destinations are not the vendor's, or the internal lateral connections are not explained

Recommended actions for this example:

  1. Ask the camera owner whether cloud or remote-view features are enabled and required.
  2. Until confirmed, restrict outbound internet access from the camera VLAN, allowing only approved destinations (M1037 Filter Network Traffic).
  3. Review the internal peers of 172.168.1.100 in Relation Map and investigate any host that should not receive traffic from a camera.
  4. If the device is considered compromised, isolate it, update the firmware, reset credentials, and reinstall a clean configuration.

Step 7 — Record the outcome in Detection Tracking​

Open Detection Tracking (left icon) and document progress.

Detection Tracking panel

  1. Set Status to Acknowledged and assign the detection to yourself.
  2. While waiting for the camera owner or while egress is being restricted, set In Progress.
  3. Set Closed when the destination is confirmed as authorized (and documented), or when the device has been remediated.

Example Notes:

Camera 172.168.1.100 (Dahua, VLAN 168) beacons to 148.153.216.91 over UDP
ports 8810-8815 every 4 minutes (90 outbound records, ~414 B each, no
inbound). Also beacons to 47.84.201.120:8800. Same peer seen from other
cameras. Beaconing confirmed; fan-out 3.1x (lateral movement signal).
Peer reputation (VirusTotal, checked 18/09/2026): 0/89, unrated,
AS11439 VertexCore LLC — unknown.
Action: asked camera owner to confirm cloud/P2P use; camera VLAN egress
restricted to approved destinations pending answer. Reviewing internal
peers via Relation Map. Status: In Progress.

Select Save.

Checklist​

StepQuestion to answerWhere
1Which detection needs attention first?Detections › All Events, filter and sort
2What was detected, on which asset, with which peer?Detection header, What Happened, Asset/Peer
3Which signals raised the risk? Which ATT&CK techniques apply?Risk Signals, MITRE ATT&CK panel
4Is the behaviour really present on the wire?Records
5What is the asset? Who is the peer? Other detections? Reputation?Participant & History, Asset Centric, Lookup
6Is it malicious or authorized? What action is needed?Your findings and the MITRE mitigations
7Are the decision and progress documented?Detection Tracking